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Markku Roinila (University of Helsinki) 
The Battle of the Endeavors: Dynamics of the Mind and Deliberation in  
New Essays on Human Understanding, book II, xx-xxi 
 
In New Essays on Human Understanding (NE) Leibniz presents an interesting picture of the human 
mind. It is a busy place where perceptions, volitions and appetitions fill each corner. These are well-
known features of the Leibnizian mind, but it is seldom acknowledged that volitions and appetitions 
can be regarded as tendencies or inclinations which have a force-like character.1 This may partly be 
because of Russell’s and others skepticism of extending physical forces outside of the realm of 
physics.2 In my view, a benevolent reading of New Essays should remove these reservations - when 
one reads chapters xx-xxi of book II, one is bound to find endeavors that are opposed to each other 
at each moment which makes the Leibnizian mind a dynamic whole: it is like a battlefield with 
victories and losses, large battle that goes on and on and smaller skirmishes which have an effect on  
the main battle. In what follows, I will present an overview of the dynamics of the mind in the New 
Essays and argue that Leibniz employed more or less explicitly two different models of decision-
making in illustrating these mental processes.   
Entelechy and Efforts 
As Leibniz argues in Monadology, §11-13, the monad’s natural changes come from an internal 
principle. Besides the principle, of which I will say more in a moment, there must be diversity in 
that which changes. The diversity is produced by perception, which is ‘the passing state which 
involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance’.3 There is a hierarchy of 
perceptions of varying clarity and distinctness in the mind which Leibniz discusses in his 1684 
article Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas.4 A systematic discussion of the role of 
confused knowledge in the mind, however, had to wait until New Essays where Leibniz relates it to 
many other mental elements, among others appetition, volition, emotion and instinct which can be 
seen as force-like desires or tendencies.5  
   Chapter xxi of the second book of NE is titled ‘Of Power and Freedom’ and in §1 Leibniz argues 
that power in general can be described as the possibility of change, but says that it is not only a 
faculty, but also an endeavor which can be distinguished into entelechy and efforts. Entelechy is 
related to primitive active force and efforts to derivative forces. When entelechy is accompanied 
with perception, it is a soul. In addition, there is a special passive force in bodies which is not in the 
mind (primary matter). (§4).  
   In Monadology, §18 Leibniz describes the entelechy or appetite as follows: ‘[Monads] have in 
themselves a certain perfection; they have a sufficiency that makes them the sources of their 
                                                          
1 A notable recent exception is Martha Brandt Bolton: “Change in the Monad”, in: Eric Watkins (ed.): The Divine Order, the Human 
Order and the Order of Nature. Historical Perspectives, New York 2013, S. 175-194. I will use the terms ‘endeavor’ and ‘force’ 
interchangeably. 
2 See Richard T. W. Arthur: Leibniz, Cambridge 2014, S. 124-125. 
3 Monadology, §14; GP VI, 608; AG, 214. See also Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, §2. I refer to the following 
editions in English: G. W. Leibniz: The Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence, translated and edited by Paul Lodge. New Haven: 2013 
(LvD), Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts, translated and edited by R. S. Woolhouse and Richards Francks, 
Oxford 1997 (WF), New Essays on Human Understanding, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 
1996 (RB), Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1989 (AG), Theodicy. 
Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, translated by E. M. Huggard, La Salle 1985 (H) and 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited with an introduction, critical apparatus and glossary by Peter H. 
Nidditch, Oxford 1975 (E).   
4 A VI, 4 A, 585-592. 
5 The idea of a dynamical mind is already in the very early Confessio philosophi (1672-73) where Leibniz identified the affects of the 
mind with conatuses in the bodies (A VI, 3, 141). On Leibniz’s early views on this topic, see my “Affects and Activity in Leibniz’s 
De Affectibus”, in: Adrian Nita (ed.): Between Continuity and Transformation: Leibniz on Substance and Subtantial Forms, 
Dordrecht 2015, S. 73-88. 
internal actions, and so to speak, incorporeal automata’.6 However, power and self-sufficiency is 
not all that the entelechy has – in New System of Nature Leibniz writes: ‘I found … that the nature 
of substantial forms consists in force, and that from this there follows something analogous to 
feeling and desire; and that they must therefore be understood along the lines of our notion on 
souls’.7 The entelechy or substantial form in substances is the source of active power and an internal 
principle or law-of-the-series, but also a certain desire or feeling for something which relates it to 
final causes.8 
   An occurrence of this power in the mind is will. When in II, xxi, §5 Philalethes argues that we 
have a power to begin, continue or end an action which is called will and that the actual exercise of 
that power is called volition, Theophilus agrees and adds in §19 that we can will only what we think 
good.9 Therefore the will in the mind is a power to initiate action and it is always directed to the 
apperceived apparent good.  
   The will as an occurrence of power has to be distinguished from volitions which are actual 
exercises of that power. Leibniz calls volitions efforts and argues in II, xxi, §5 that his view of 
volitions goes deeper than Locke’s: ‘I shall say that volition is the effort or endeavor (conatus) to 
move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad, the endeavor arising 
immediately out of one’s awareness of those things’.10 Volitions are thus efforts founded on 
apperceived perceptions which initiate actions that lead us to the apparent good unless we are 
somehow prevented or limited to exercise the power of will. The exercise of will is not only an act 
of the mind, but also cause movement in our bodies due to psychophysical parallelism.  
   The second kind of effort arises from insensible perceptions: ‘I prefer to call them ‘appetitions’ 
rather than volitions, for one describes as ‘voluntary’ only actions one can be aware of and can 
reflect upon when they arise from some consideration of good and bad’.11 Appetitions consist of 
minute or insensible, confused cognition and can incline us to goals we are not aware of. Whereas 
volitions are founded on the present perceptions and exhausted when they lead to actions, 
involuntary thoughts or appetitions come to us both from the body where outer objects affect our 
senses and from our mind, as a result of often undetectable traces that are left behind by earlier 
perceptions which continue to operate and mingle with new ones. Appetitions are inclinations 
arising from sensible qualities, such as sounds, odors etc., which constantly affect our judgment due 
to their vividness, leading the mind away from clearly and distinctly perceived goods which are the 
objects of the will.12  
   Thus we can find that there is a constant opposition between the derivative endeavors, that is, 
efforts of volition and appetition. Each volition is important, as Leibniz emphasizes that through 
them we often indirectly prepare the way for other voluntary actions. Self-perfection is a sort of 
systematic virtuous habit which requires that we are successful in the process of fighting against 
involuntary appetitions which may incline us to unwanted goals without us noticing it.13  
Weakness of Will 
 
A classic example to illustrate this battle between voluntary and involuntary thoughts is employed 
in NE II, xxi, §35, where the dialogue turns to the problem of akrasia or weakness of the will. 
Philalethes says:   
 
                                                          
6 GP VI, 609-610; AG, 215. 
7 GP IV, 479; WF, 12. 
8 See Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, §3. 
9 See also A, VI, 1, 284.   
10 A VI, 6, 172; RB, 172. 
11 NE II, xxi, §5; A VI, 6, 173; RB, 173. 
12 See NE II, xxi, §12. 
13 NE II, xxi, §23 & §29. 
Let a drunkard see, that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even 
of his beloved drink, attends him in the course he follows; yet the returns of disquiet [uneasiness in Locke’s Essay] 
to miss his companions’ drives hum to the tavern at his usual time, ‘though he has in view the loss of health and 
plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life’ – joys which he cannot regard as inconsiderable, and which on the 
contrary he confesses to be far better than the pleasures of drinking ‘or the idle chat of a soaking club.14 
 
Locke alludes to Ovid’s classic formulation of akrasia which shows that he is aware of the 
traditional problem.15 In response, Theophilus argues that our ideas of real goods are often symbolic 
or blind, empty of sensibility, which is why the more vivid sensual images draw our attention to 
them: ‘Thus, if we prefer the worse it is because we have a sense of the good it contains but not of 
the evil it contains or of the good which exists on the opposite side…the finest moral precepts and 
the best prudential rules in the world have weight only in a soul which is as sensitive to them as to 
what opposes them’.16  
   If our will is not seasoned enough, it may be swept away by disquiet which is Leibnizian term for 
Lockean uneasiness, signifying a disposition to suffering rather than the suffering itself.17 Leibniz 
cites Cicero who said that if our eyes could see the beauty of virtue we would love it ardently.18 In 
this skirmish between the efforts of volition and appetition the problem really comes down to the 
epistemological status of what we perceive as good or pleasant although Leibniz does also 
recognize cases where we knowingly choose the less good proposed course of action.19 If our idea 
of the good is confused, we do not see all the dimensions it has, especially its effects to the future 
good. Leibniz goes on to argue: ‘This struggle between [flesh and spirit] is nothing but the conflict 
between different endeavors – those that come from confused thoughts and those that come from 
distinct ones. Confused thoughts often make themselves vividly sensed, whereas distinct ones are 
usually only potentially vivid’. 20  
   As volitions are the exercises of the will, it is important to acknowledge that the conflict between 
the endeavors does not only concern the efforts as separate inclinations, but that it extends to the 
formation of the volition itself. The disquiet which arises from minute perceptions is part and parcel 
of the formation of final volition, and because of this it may happen that volitions are not 
necessarily directed to real, objective goods or that the goods we are aware of are reached only 
partially in the moral act that follows from the deliberation. The confused elements in the process 
may distort or overcome the clearly and distinctly perceived goods and the final effort is a kind of 
dynamical outcome of all the present inclinations:  
 
Various perceptions and inclinations combine to produce a complete volition: it is the result of the conflict amongst 
them. There are some, imperceptible in themselves, which add up to a disquiet which impels us without our seeing 
why. There are some which join forces to carry us toward or away from some object, in which case there is desire 
or fear, also accompanied by a disquiet but not always one amounting to pleasure or displeasure. Finally, there are 
some impulses which are accompanied by actual pleasure or suffering. All these perceptions are either new 
sensations or the lingering images of past ones (whether or not accompanied by memory): these images revive the 
charms which were associated with them in those earlier sensations, and thereby also revive the former impulses in 
proportion to the liveliness of the imagining. The eventual result of all these impulses is the prevailing effort, 
which makes a full volition.21   
Therefore, at each moment there is a conflict going on in the mind between the efforts or derivative 
forces. As there is always some disquiet present, the volitions are always somewhat affected by the 
                                                          
14 A VI, 6, 184-185; RB, 184-185. 
15 E, 253-254. 
16 NE II, xxi, §35; A VI, 6, 186, RB, 186. 
17 NE II, xx, §6. 
18 A VI, 6, 186. 
19 See NE I, ii, §11. 
20 NE II, xxi, §35, A VI, 6, 186-187, RB, 186-187. In what follows, Leibniz lists various methods of preparing the mind against the 
temptations of the senses. On this topic, see my “Deliberation and Self-Improvement in Leibniz”, in: Herbert Breger/Jürgen 
Herbst/Sven Erdner (Hrsg.): Einheit in der Vielheit. VIII. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover 2006, Vorträge 2. Teil, S. 856-
63.  
21 II, xxi, §39; A VI, 6, 192; RB, 192. 
appetitions. All the different inclinations are in conflict with each other and contribute to the final 
volition which often deviates from the path of the distinctly perceived apparent good because of the 
conflict between distinct and confused elements in the mind.  
   There may also be cases where there is no fully developed desire for the good present in the mind 
which results in indecision, a state where one is in a state of disquiet, not knowing what she wants.22 
Another case of disturbance in the will is a case of velleitas where a defect or imperfection in the 
will (such as the proposed course of action harming one’s friends) prevents it to rise to full power.23 
Thus there may be cases when disquiet is predominating the deliberation, but there never are 
deliberations where volitions are not affected by the appetitions.  
A Model for Analyzing Concurrent Goods 
I will now leave the New Essays for a moment and introduce a model for decision-making which 
Leibniz was developing as an alternative to the Aristotelian practical syllogism in his early practical 
memoirs in 1660’s and 1670’s.24 The model is founded on the idea that there might be several 
simultaneous goods competing with each other and one has to take them all into account in the final 
decision instead of choosing one good to be realized. 
   This model, which Simo Knuuttila has called a vectorial model of rational decision-making,25 was 
designed on the basis of behavior of forces in nature26 and therefore I believe it is suitable for 
illustrating the battle of endeavors in the mind. In addition, the vectorial model can be seen closely 
related to the Leibniz’s discussions in metaphysical mathematics, where different rays of light, for 
example, follow paths or variations of which only one is the best or optimal one.27 Leibniz applied 
the same idea to the design of the best world of which he said in On the Ultimate Origination of 
Things (1697): ‘Hence it is very clearly understood that out of the infinite combinations and series 
of possible things, one exists through which the greatest amount of essence or possibility is brought 
into existence.’28  
   In the vectorial model efforts, that is, different inclinations to goods or away from evil, are 
conceptualized as vectors leading to different directions. The final volition, the outcome of the 
conflict between the different inclinations takes place as it were in mechanics and leads to the 
direction/good which results from all the inclinations/goods taken together. As the efforts resist 
each other, the outcome is a trade-off where all the goods are included but in a reduced form or as 
limited in power. In other words, the final volition is a compromise between the goods involved. 
This is why the final volition usually reaches the clearly and distinctly willed good only partially.  
   The vectorial model illustrates Leibniz’s description of divine decision-making in Theodicy, §22: 
‘Consequent will, final and decisive, results from the conflict of all the antecedent wills, of those 
which tend towards good, even as of those which repel evil; and from the concurrence of all these 
particular wills comes the total will’.29 This description seems to be very similar to formation of 
volition in New Essays discussed above. There are inclinations to the good and away from evil 
involved and from all of those results the final volition.  
   In fact, later in Theodicy, §325 Leibniz argues that human deliberation is analogous to divine 
decision-making. The difference is that while God deliberates perfectly due to his nature, in men the 
deliberation results in more or less good final volition, depending on the present inclinations:  
                                                          
22 NE II, xxi, §39; A VI, 6, 192. 
23 NE, II, xxi, §30. 
24 For a more extensive presentation of the vectorial model and case-studies of its use, see my Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making. 
Helsinki 2007. Available from http://philpapers.org/rec/ROILOR 
25 Simo Knuuttila: ‘Old and New in Leibniz’s View of Rational Decision’, in Stephen F. Brown (ed.): Meeting of the Minds. The 
Relations Between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy. Turnhout 1998.  
26 See Jaakko Hintikka: ‘Was Leibniz’s Deity an Akrates?’, in: Simo Knuuttila (ed.), Modern Modalities, Dordrecht 1998, S. 98-99. 
27 See Tentamen anagogium, GP VII, 270-279. 
28 AG, 150.  
29 GP VI, 116; H, 137. 
As very often there are divers courses to choose from, one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a 
force which puts forth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or 
there is least resistance. For instance, air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in order to escape. 
It puts forth effort at every part, but finally flings itself upon the weakest. Thus do the inclinations of the soul extend 
over all the goods that present themselves: they are antecedent acts of will; but the consequent will, which is their 
result, is determined in the direction of that which touches most closely.30 
 
It is evident that Leibniz is here applying the same model. Inclinations to particular or antecedent 
apparent goods (‘goods that present themselves’) can be seen as variations or vectors inclining to 
different directions, much like forces in Leibniz’s philosophy of nature.31 In addition, there is a 
force which puts effort on various sides simultaneously. This can be seen as the primitive active 
force or entelechy, as the faculty of will is understood to be part of that power. The final volition is 
determined by the concurrence of antecedent goods – it is ‘the result of a number of vector-like 
forces pulling the agent (so to speak) in different directions’, to quote Hintikka.32 An essential 
feature of the calculus of variations which Leibniz anticipated in his Tentamen anagogicum is that it 
is possible to find an optimal path or variation of which Leibniz uses the term easiest – later on, 
Maupertuis popularized the same idea as the principle of least action. In terms of the mind, it is the 
inclination/good which seems best to the deliberator, or, as formulated here, ‘direction of that which 
touches most closely’.33 Note that the ‘direction of that which touches most closely’ is not 
necessarily the same direction as that of the unmodified will.  
   To return to New Essays I think that this passage in II, xxi, §40 is very similar to the one in 
Theodicy above:  
Since the final result is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that the 
most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even if it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavors taken singly, it 
may be outweighed by all of them taken together...the mind should make provision for this from a distance, for 
once battle has been engaged there is no time left to make use of such artifices: everything which then impinges on 
us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics; so that 
without some prompt diversion we will be unable to stop it.34 
The resultant direction of the conflict of various efforts may be unexpected and to avoid these kinds 
of situations we should prepare our minds in good time for difficult deliberations where we can 
easily be swept away by vivid inclinations to unwanted goods. Although we may have a strong, 
apperceived desire for some good, it may be outweighed by other inclinations taken together and 
the final course of action may be directed to some other good. In other words, if we are not prepared 
properly, the temptations in the situation may overcome our pre-determined intention to act in a 
certain way. But when our mind is trained, the appetitions have less effect on the exercise of the 
will. When one looks at Leibniz’s formulations, such as “contributes to determining a resultant 
direction”, it is easy to see that the Leibniz had the vectorial model in mind also in New Essays.  
   But this is not all. A central asset of the model is the possibility to employ geometrical figures to 
help conceptualization of the concurrent goods. In this way the vectorial model can act as a 
heuristic tool for rational decision-making in finding reasonable combinations of goods with respect 
to criteria determined by the deliberator (Leibniz always employs two criteria). In II, xxi, §66 
Leibniz alludes to this feature of the model. The context is Philalethes’s discussion of calculated 
risks and Leibniz argues that one can estimate the expected desirability by multiplying desirability 
by probability. This can be illustrated with a geometrical figure as follows:  
The question of how inevitable a result is heterogeneous from – i. e. cannot be compared with – the question of 
how good or bad it is. So in trying to compare them, moralists have become muddled, as can be seen from writings 
                                                          
30 G VI, 309, H, 322. 
31 Compare also Leibniz’s comment to Bayle: ‘The soul, even though it has no parts, has within it, because of the multitude of 
representations of external things…a great number, or rather an infinite number, of variations (WF, 101). 
32 Hintikka: ‘Was Leibniz’s Deity an Akrates?’, S. 99.   
33 See Tentamen anagogicum, GP VII, 270-279.  
34 A VI, 6, 193; RB, 193. 
on probability. The fact is that in this as in other assessments which are disparate, heterogeneous, having more than 
one dimension (so to speak), the magnitude of the thing in question is made up proportionately out of two 
estimates; as with a rectangle, where two things have to be considered, namely its length and its breadth.35 
It is obvious that the vectorial model for assessment and decision-making can be applied in many 
kinds of difficult deliberations concerning concurrent goods. Leibniz’s descriptions of the model are 
very abstract, but it is clear that he employs Descartes’s analytical geometry to show how one can 
map and assess different combinations of goods. The combinations are results of multiplication 
rather than of addition as Leibniz explains to Arnauld in a letter in 1671 when he tried to show how 
to estimate the beauty of a man according to canon law. According to him, if a man has wisdom of 
the third degree and power in the fourth, his total estimation would be twelve and not seven, since 
wisdom can be of assistance to power.36 This idea can be fruitfully illustrated in a co-ordinate 
system. 
Activity and Passivity 
I hope to have shown that Leibniz’s philosophy of action is very complex and that in his view there 
is a constant conflict between different endeavors in the mind. To recap: the soul is constituted by 
an entelechy consisting of primitive active force together with perception, from which arise efforts 
of volition and appetition. Each deliberation takes place as it were mechanically, as the conflict 
between the efforts determines the final direction of the will. The efforts are derivative forces which 
modify the primitive active force of the entelechy. This battle of endeavors in the mind can be 
regarded as analogous to interaction of endeavors in bodies of which Leibniz wrote to Jaquelot as 
follows:  
There are two sorts of force in bodies, a primitive force which is essential to it, and derived forces, which also 
depend on other bodies. And we have to realize that derivative or accidental force, which we cannot deny to 
moving bodies, must be a modification of primitive force, just as shape is a modification of extension. Accidental 
forces could have no place in a substance without essential force, because accidents are only modifications or 
limitations, and can never contain more perfection or reality than does the substance.37 
Following this description, one might say that the primitive active force in the mind or will is 
modified or limited by derivative forces which contain less perfection than the primitive force. This 
kind of interaction is analogous to the efficacious causation in bodies although there is no prime 
matter in the minds.  
   Each modification of the will is related directly to activity and passivity in the soul and indirectly 
to epistemological clarity and various moral qualities such as goodness or evil and pleasure or 
displeasure. In Leibniz’s metaphysics, activity and passivity has a central metaphysical role, as can 
be seen from this passage in an appendix to New System of Nature: ‘Since everything that can be 
understood in substances reduces to their actions and passions, and to the way they are arranged to 
produce those effects, I do not see that it is possible to find in substances anything more basic than 
the principle of all of that – that is, than force...’38  
   The chapter xxi of book II of New Essays both starts and ends with discussion of action and 
passion. In §1 Leibniz characterizes power in general as possibility of change and continues: ‘Since 
change or the actualization of that possibility – is action in one subject and passion in another, there 
will be two powers, one active and passive.’39  In the end of the chapter Leibniz adds 
epistemological and affective aspects to the picture:   
If we take “action” to be an endeavor towards perfection, and “passion” to be the opposite, then genuine substances 
are active only when their perceptions are becoming better developed and more distinct, just as they are passive 
                                                          
35 A VI, 6, 205-206; RB, 205-206. 
36 A II, 1, 174. 
37 WF, 201; See also Leibniz’s letter to De Volder 21. 1. 1704, GP II, 262; LvD, 286-287. 
38 WF, 35. 
39 A VI, 6, 169; RB, 169. See also Monadology, §49-52. 
only when their perceptions are becoming more confused. Consequently, in substances which are capable of 
pleasure and pain every action is a move towards pleasure, every passion a move towards pain.40 
This is a rich account. When we start to dismantle it, we can distinguish between active and passive 
elements of the mind. Action involves more distinct perceptions, that is, a process towards distinct 
cognition as well as a process towards pleasure and perfection. Passion is an opposite of these, that 
is, process towards confused perceptions and displeasure or pain and imperfection. One might think 
that the soul is always either active or passive, but this is not the case. Rather there is a constant 
change going on in the soul - in II, xxi, §36 it is argued that we are never without some activity and 
motion, simply because nature continually labors to be more completely at ease. Therefore we are 
never completely in equilibrium and can never be evenly balanced between two oppositions.41 This 
is due to minute, insensible perceptions which are omnipresent in our deliberation.  
Pleasure and Happiness 
I will now turn to affections of the mind which are essentially related to activity, perfection and 
final causes. In II, xx, §9 Theophilus argues that emotions are not beliefs as the Stoics took them to 
be, but endeavors or modifications of endeavor which arise from beliefs or opinions and are 
accompanied by pleasure or displeasure.42 Therefore emotions are related to the efforts. As 
emotions arise from pleasure or displeasure, which again can be divided to minute semi-pleasures 
or semi-sufferings,43 they are usually related to appetitions. In that case they are feelings or disquiet 
and only when they grow or accumulate and find an object, one can discuss of passions relating to 
some apperceived good.44   
   Emotions as efforts can effectively either affirm or limit the striving of the entelechy towards the 
good and perfection. This is because pleasure and displeasure are closely related to perfection and 
imperfection: ‘Although pleasure cannot be given a nominal definition, any more than light or color 
can, it can like them be defined causally: I believe that, fundamentally, pleasure is a sentiment of 
perfection, and pain a sentiment of imperfection, provided that each is notable enough to be 
apperceived’.45  
   If we are aware of the pleasure in our minds, we are sensing or feeling perfection and if we are 
aware of feeling displeasure or pain, we are sensing imperfection. The corresponding passions are 
joy and sorrow - joy is defined in xx, §7 as a state when pleasure predominates in a man and sorrow 
in §8 as a state when displeasure dominates over pleasure.46 However, Leibniz argues that there can 
be displeasure even when we are joyful and vice versa.47 Joy motivates us in our striving for the 
good and sorrow discourages us, but it also indirectly motivates us in giving us reasons to overcome 
the displeasure we suffer from. In this way the will can be modified by intellectual passions of joy, 
hope and love which relate to perfection and which promote activity.  
   In addition, Leibniz argues that we are instinctively disposed towards pleasure. In NE, I, ii, §2 he 
says:   
Although it is correct to say that morality has indemonstrable principles, of which one of the first and most 
practical is that we should pursue joy and avoid sorrow, it must be added that that is not a truth which is known 
solely from reason, since it is based on inner experience – on confused knowledge; for one only senses what joy 
and sorrow are.48   
                                                          
40 NE II, xxi, §72; A VI, 6, 210; RB, 210. 
41 A VI, 6, 188. 
42 A VI, 6, 167. 
43 NE II, xx, §6. Leibniz notes that this is actually a good thing as in an opposite case our whole attention would be captured by 
fleeting semi-sufferings (A VI, 6, 165).  
44 On Leibniz’s theory of emotions, see my ’Leibniz on Hope’, in Sabrina Ebbersmeyer: Emotional Minds, Berlin 2012, S. 161-178.  
45 NE II, xxi, §41; A VI, 6, 194; RB, 194. 
46 See also II, xxi, §64. 
47 A VI, 6, 167. 
48 A VI, 6, 89; RB, 89. 
 It is evident that the instinct is related to feeling or sensing perfection as Leibniz argues that it is 
based on confused knowledge and it leads us towards joy and away from sorrow. In §9 he argues 
that it is related to feelings that comes from an innate truth:  
That natural feeling is the perception of an innate truth, though very often a confused one as are the experiences of 
the outer senses. Thus innate truths can be distinguished from the natural light (which contains only what is 
distinctly knowable) as a genus should be distinguished from its species, since innate truths comprise instincts as 
well as the natural light.49  
The moral instinct seems to be a sort of aid to reason and does not only lead to affections, but also 
to science and reasoning as it finds future pleasures in them.50 Leibniz does not explicate the 
relation between the will and the instinct, but as they both are directed to the good it seems probable 
that they are both instances of the appetite, the will functioning in the level of distinct cognition and 
the instinct in the level of confused cognition.51 
   In the larger picture Leibniz gives in New Essays, minute perceptions and the disquiet which 
arises from them are not only harmful to our moral action, but necessary for our happiness:   
Nature’s accumulation of continual little triumphs, in which it puts itself more and more at ease – drawing closer to 
the good and enjoying the image of it, or reducing the feeling of suffering – is itself a considerable pleasure, often 
better than the actual enjoyment of the good. Far from such disquiet’s being inconsistent with happiness, I find that 
it is essential to the happiness of created beings; their happiness never consists in complete attainment…but in 
continual and uninterrupted progress towards greater goods.52 
Thus passive, confused cognition can in fact produce activity by stimulating and motivating the will 
to develop one’s understanding, to gain small victories when displeasure or suffering is overcome 
by pleasure piece by piece. Happiness is a not a state, but rather an ongoing process of lasting joy. 
Therefore, passivity is an essential part of the human condition, although one has to learn to 
moderate the appetitions and disquiet with strong will which in turn requires a trained mind: ‘The 
more developed the faculty of understanding is the better are the choices of the will. And in the 
other direction, in so far as a man wills vigorously, he determines his thoughts by his own choice 
instead of being swept along by involuntary perceptions’.53  
   But sometimes even vigorous willing is not enough: ‘Even when the desire is strong enough in 
itself to arouse us if nothing hinders it, it can be blocked by contrary inclinations, either consisting 
in a mere propensity, like the germ or beginning of a desire, or amounting to an actual desire.’54  
   To sum up, we are instinctively disposed towards pleasure and joy which lead us to activity, 
goodness and perfection and away from displeasure and sorrow which are related to passivity, evil 
and imperfection. If we perfect our understanding systematically, we may be able to act according 
to the final causes and strive for lasting joy or happiness without interruption. In this case the 
confused elements in the deliberation have less effect on the clear and distinct ideas of the good and 
the final volition affirms the choices of the will. However, each deliberation is different and it is 
often not possible to predict the outcome of the conflict of efforts.  
 
Balance of Reason 
We have seen that there are active and passive elements in the soul, constantly affecting each other 
within the skirmishes that are deliberations or formations of final volition. I have argued that these 
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can be illustrated by the vectorial model where the resulting outcome is a kind of compromise of the 
inclinations present. This can be compared to behavior of forces in nature and consequently to be 
understood more in terms of efficient causation than final causation although the deliberator can 
influence her decisions indirectly by developing her mind beforehand.  
   For the great battle between primary and derivative forces another kind of model is required. The 
overall balance between the endeavors, or rather the consequences that the individual skirmishes 
produce should be thought in terms of final causes, that is, moral goodness and moral evil and 
metaphysical goodness or perfection and metaphysical evil or imperfection. One can see singular 
deliberations and the resulting moral acts as producing more or less perfection and the continuous 
series of these singular exercise of the will is what one can call the moral development of a moral 
agent or a rational being. 
   The model I have in mind can be called, following Marcelo Dascal, the balance of reason.55 The 
model can be illustrated by a traditional pair of scales and one can put weights into the right or left 
pans in order to see to which side the pair of scales inclines to. The model is very old and Leibniz 
applied it especially to cases in jurisprudence: ‘I present here a certain balance of the law, a new 
kind of instrument with which it is possible to estimate the value, not of precious metals and stones, 
but of something more precious than that: the weights of reasons.’56 If we think of the single 
deliberations based on the principle of sufficient reason, we have here an instrument of weighing 
reasons from which the happiness of men consists of.57  
  Let me explain what I have in mind. Each single skirmish between the efforts where the confused 
elements in the mind interact with the clear and distinct ideas of the good ends up to an outcome 
which affirms or limits the striving of the entelechy to the good. If we take the outcome of each 
single formation of volition and put in on either the pan representing goodness or perfection or the 
pan representing evil or imperfection, we can at each moment see a reflection of the degree of 
perfection of the law-of-the-series of the soul. The pair of scales is not likely to be wholly on either 
side or in equilibrium as each deliberation can affect the balance. For the same reason, the 
inclination between the pans is likely to be very small and change often unless the agent decides 
systematically to develop one’s virtue, that is, train her mind and strengthen her will in which case 
the deliberations are likely in most deliberations to affirm the will which is always directed to the 
good and perfection.  
   The nearest Leibniz comes in explicitly employing the model is in II, xxi, §67, soon after he 
introduced the vectorial model: ‘Indeed, for the right decision to be made in a case where reasons 
have to be weighed against one another, many things are needed. That is much the way it is with 
merchant’s account books…the book-keeper…carefully adds up the columns on each page.’58 
   One can regard this model to illustrate moral action on a higher level as it represents the long run-
moral action of a rational agent. As we have seen, self-perfection can happen only indirectly as the 
individual deliberations can fail due to strong passions or other reasons why we prefer the worse 
course of action to the apperceived ideas of the good. While the smaller skirmishes can be seen to 
have almost random consequences, a cunning general or a woman of virtue can direct the great 
battle wisely. By following clear and distinct ideas she will find that the balance inclines eventually 
to victory or goodness/perfection/happiness and the forces at play will turn out to work as planned.  
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